You know, Vietnam wasn’t that long ago, Somali was a catastrophe, and Iraq is still technically going on. We’re still the lone eagle. Why would some distant, barely functional state suddenly change everything?
The Afghan-American relationship is strange. It strikes me as odd that the state of Afghanistan, if you dare call it a state, has the unique ability of attracting hundreds of millions of dollars worth of aid, hordes of human capital, and an untold amount of political capital from the world’s most powerful nation. Barring a few potentially good arguments, most rational analysis suggests a change in policy. However, America has found itself choking on its own pride, intimidated by the fear of losing its credibility.
Recently, I’ve noticed the credibility argument as a primary reason for our open-ended commitment to Afghanistan. It goes something like this: if the U.S. were to withdrawal or drastically alter its policy, it would severely damage U.S. credibility and cause other U.S. clients to doubt our global influence and staying power. I don’t doubt that if a U.S. withdrawal precipitated the collapse of Afghanistan a few weaker clients might question the reliability of our partnership. But those type of partnerships are probably better off at a distance. Besides, our most important relationships aren’t those that depend on our success in Afghanistan.
Moreover, those who posit the credibility argument seem to forget the nature of America’s interstate relations. It’s a pleasant luxury of a superpower that most of its relationships aren’t mutually dependent. Most of America’s clients need our support much more than we need theirs. It’s highly unlikely that those in need of U.S. assistance will severe ties because we failed to rebuild a dysfunctional state. On the contrary, disengaging from Afghanistan would send a stern message to other U.S. aid-recipients: no free riders allowed. Far too often America seems more like a philanthropic organization doling out cash and resources regardless of the performance or level of competency of the receiver. Non-performance based aid was a major problem in Iraq and too little was done too late to make-up for wasted spending and poor results. If we were halt our massive support to Afghanistan and it then collapsed, think of the message this would send to other clients reliant on our support. Shape up or die.
Among other things, an unoccupied Afghanistan would do two other potentially beneficial things concerning Pakistan, Afghanistan’s most involved neighbor. For one, it would put some serious pressure on Pakistan to clean up its own backyard, or, at the very least, keep the Taliban, Al-Queda and other terrorist in-check. Second, it would keep the U.S. from directly meddling in the affairs of Pakistan, something that seems to piss them off more and more these days.
Besides, the type of credibility were talking about is the U.S.’s ability to transform a backassward state into modern, democratic state. Forgive my disregard for underdeveloped states, but since when has nation building been the primary focus of a state? I suppose it crept into America’s collective foreign policy consciousness after our Neo-Con inoculation. But I thought we were over that? We’re in the age of renewed realism, right? Perhaps not. Regardless, something like nation building shouldn’t be the primary concern of a superpower, or any state for that matter. Nation building ought to be a secondary concern, if a concern at all.
The issue that is consequently relegated to the back burner is America’s relative position of power. While we channel enormous amount of resources into the desert of Asia, other states are filling the void left by America’s absence. States like China, India, the European Union, and Russia reap the benefits of a distracted America. While we focus on futile efforts to overhaul a corrupt and dysfunctional state, others are focused on improving their positions of power vis-a-vis America. A nation’s primary concern ought to be securing its vital interests at home and aboard while maximizing its position of power. We shouldn’t be concerned that a few unimportant friends might label us as namby-pamby yellow-bellies. America is playing the game wrong right now. Grand visions of reshaping the world through a democratic lens tends to invite all the ills of myopia.
